The possibility of a harmony between the psychological doctrine of Aristotle and that of Plato marks a significant issue within the context of the debate surrounding Aristotle's putative opposition to or harmony with Plato's philosophy. The standard interpretation of Aristotle's conception of the soul being purely hylomorphic leaves no room for harmonisation with Plato, nor does a functionalist interpretation that reduces Aristotle's psychological doctrine to physicalist terms. However, these interpretations have serious drawbacks, both in terms of ad-hoc explanations formulated in the developmentalist mode, and the misconstruing of some of the fundamental features of Aristotle's psychological doctrine. A dualist interpretation that accepts Aristotle's doctrine of some part of the soul being properly incorporeal, separable and immortal overcomes these drawbacks and, significantly, opens the door for Platonic harmonisation. Furthermore, it can be shown that the kind of immortality in question is also in line with the Platonic stance, due to a deep similarity between the conceptions of metaphysical and moral personhood held by Plato and his student. However, this Aristotelian dualism is not Platonic dualism simpliciter. Rather, it is best understood in terms of the division of labour between Aristotle and Plato suggested by the Neoplatonic commentators generally, and Simplicius in particular. I argue that though questions surrounding these issues and particularly the issue of reincarnation remain, an account of Aristotle's psychological doctrine as dualist and in harmony with Plato's view of the soul can be shown to be stronger than both standard hylomorphic and functionalist accounts, both exegetically and philosophically.
Introduction
In the context of the debate surrounding the putative harmony between Plato and Aristotle, the issue of whether Aristotle's conception of the soul is harmonious with a Platonic notion of the soul comes down to one key factor: separability (in the sense of the metaphysical possibility of a separable soul, but also regarding separability as a prerequisite for immortality). In modern scholarship, the separable soul in Aristotle has been rejected concomitant with Aristotle's rejection of separable forms, the soul being the form of the body for Aristotle. If however, there is reason to believe that Aristotle does not reject separable forms outright 2 , then what remains is to ascertain to what extent Aristotle believes the soul to be separable from the body, and whether or not Aristotle's position is then harmonious with the Platonic stance.
I will argue that Aristotle's dualism can be shown to be in harmony with Platonic dualism, but should not be reduced to it, and that the immortality of the intellect found in Aristotle stems from a striking similarity in Plato and Aristotle's conceptions of personhood, and as such their conceptions of disembodied personhood (some significant caveats notwithstanding). Towards this end I will critically review some salient features of the contemporary debate with focus on the two relevant issues: 1) the debate surrounding hylomorphism and dualism in Aristotle and; 2) the nature and extent of ‗personal immortality' and the related problem of reincarnation. For the former, I will attempt to show that, as Lloyd Gerson in his 2005 work Aristotle and Other Platonists has convincingly argued, a dualist interpretation of Aristotle overcomes the deficiencies of both hylomorphic and functionalist interpretations, though ultimately the dualism that emerges may be something quite different than has been generally associated with Aristotle. For the latter I will aim to show that a Neoplatonic strategy of ‗division of labour' satisfyingly harmonizes the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of intellectual immortality, and that Aristotle's apparent rejection of reincarnation is no serious impediment to this harmonization. . According to Gerson, the case for harmony is partly cumulative and also partly inferential:
-The more one sees harmony in a particular area, the more one is inclined to consider it in another, perhaps hitherto unsuspected. And naturally, the more one views Aristotle's philosophy as a system, the more one is inclined to view partial harmony as suggesting, if not entailing, complete harmony. Still, from the Neoplatonists' point of view, resistance to an account of Aristotle's philosophy as a system is not all that troubling. Platonism itself provided all the systematic structure necessary.
…most of the Neoplatonic material… assumes harmony rather than presenting a brief on its behalf… Most revealingly, we shall see time and again that a text seemingly resistant to any reasonable conclusion regarding its meaning has been rendered so by an antiharmonist assumption. When scholars repeatedly say, -This is what the text appears to mean, though it simply can't mean that since that would be Platonic,‖ it is perhaps salutary to re-examine the assumption that leads to this cul-de-sac.‖ . For the purposes of this current paper, it will be sufficient to show that Aristotle's positions on the soul, in terms of its incorporeality, separability and immortality, are complementary to the corresponding Platonic positions in a way that indicates harmony beyond mere consistency. That is to say that the similarities between these positions seem to indicate a fundamental and substantial compatibility that cannot be reduced to mere non-contradiction, but rather seems to indicate, to some degree, a fundamental harmony, as suggested by the Neoplatonic harmonists.
Separability of the Soul in Aristotle 8
If the soul for Aristotle is utterly inseparable from the body, any attempt at harmonization with a Platonic notion of soul is summarily defeated. The issue here hinges on the proper conceptualization of Aristotle's conception of soul; is it hylomorphic, functionalist, dualist, or something else? In the following sections I will argue that the evidence weighs in favour of a dualist interpretation of Aristotle, though this dualism is not straightforward. Nevertheless, the position I argue for has benefits over both purely hylomorphic and functionalist interpretations of Aristotle. Firstly, ascribing a kind of dualism to Aristotle takes away the need to explain an apparent internal contradiction through developmentalist means -a strategy that offers more problems than solutions 9
. Secondly, such an account rests on an interpretation of De Anima that does not dismiss certain key comments 6 For more see Hadot and Chase 2015. 7 Coombs 2016: 17-63. 8 Adapted from ibid, 114-120. 9 In order to explain apparent contradictions in the Aristotelian corpus, modern scholars, most notably Werner Jaeger, theorized that Aristotle's early thought was Platonic, but that Aristotle developed away from Platonism to a position that was more or less explicitly anti-Platonic. See Jaeger 1948 , cf. Case 1925 . See also Gerson 2005 :12-14 and Coombs 2016 from Aristotle without sufficient justification. Finally, a dualist interpretation sheds light on
Aristotle's conception of psyche as a whole, showing that separability is not a provisional or hypothetical consideration for Aristotle, but is essential for Aristotle's account of cognition as such.
With these considerations in mind, let us turn first to the two key poles of the debate here:
hylomorphism versus dualism.
Hylomorphist versus dualist interpretations of soul in Aristotle
Many of the debates on Aristotle's conception of υστή in the modern era have centred on pinpointing whether or not the Philosopher's formulation of the relation of the soul to the body actually commits him to some or other species of dualism, instead of the standard ‗hylomorphic' interpretation. This is to say that Aristotle (Aristotle De An. B1 412b5-6) claims that the soul is the form (or ‗actuality') of the body (a hylomorphic account), but also that the soul is immortal -an account incompatible with hylomorphism. The relevant passage for the latter is found in the somewhat notorious section -From this it is clear that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) -for the actuality of some of them is the actuality of the parts themselves. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. Further, we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship.‖
The Neoplatonic harmonist Pseudo-Simplicius took this analogy to illustrate that the soul was in one respect inseparable and in another separable from the body, as we shall see below.
Modern commentators, on the other hand, have generally responded very differently to the remark. Hicks (1907: 320) , for example, takes the developmentalist line, and writes concerning the sailor-ship analogy that:
11 See Nuyens 1948 and Nuyens et al. 1950 . For critiques of Nuyens, see Block 1961 , Hardie 1964 , Lefèvre 1972 , Charlton 1987 , Wedin 1988 , Frede 1992 , Cohen 1992 and Dancy 1996 See also Coombs 2016: 52-62.
-If the conclusion of Metaph. Z., C. II represents [Aristotle's]… mature judgement, it may be plausibly argued that in our present passage ἔηι δὲ ἄδηλον is a mere phrase of the lecture room, like ζκεπηέον ύζηερον, an affectation of uncertainty because the writer is stimulating, without satisfying, curiosity.‖ 13 Hamlyn and Shields (1993: 87) A functionalist interpretation of soul in Aristotle Heinaman (1990: 100-102 
A dualist interpretation of soul in Aristotle
On the side of those who resist both the dismissal of Aristotle's dualism as well as the arguments for functionalism, we find some who in addition believe that Aristotle's psychological doctrine indeed commits him to a form of dualism. One example is the ‗supervenient dualism' proposed by Shields (1988: 106) . Robinson (1983) also argues for dualism in Aristotle. Gerson (2005: 139) notes that
Robinson's -account of -Aristotelian dualism‖ would… do equally well as an account of Platonic dualism of the embodied person‖. Heinaman (1990: 90-92) , on the other hand, assigns to Aristotle a version of dualism known as ‗emergent dualism' -though he himself admits that this assignment is not entirely straightforward. Gerson (2005: 139-140) instead argues that Aristotle's dualism is essentially akin to Platonic dualism, and so, contrary to the position argued by Heinaman, unproblematically endorses a conception of (part of the) soul as properly incorporeal, defeating the traditional straightforwardly hylomorphic account of Aristotle's psychological doctrine (as well as any straightforward functionalist account), and leaving Aristotle's doctrine readily reconcilable with the Platonic account. According to Gerson (2005: 139-140 ) separable and incorporeal intellect are essential for the Aristotelian account of human cognition; without separable and incorporeal intellect self-reflexivity in the psyche would not be possible, and without self-reflexivity in the psyche human cognition proper, as Aristotle wants to maintain it, would not be possible. This assertion, alongside the contentions that the active and passive intellect produce intellection in concert, and that without self-reflexivity internal psychic conflict could not occur (when in fact it evidently does), establishes the necessity of incorporeality for
Aristotle's conception of psyche. If we further posit that a separated and incorporeal intellect would also be immortal, then this makes the possibility of harmony with Platonic psychological doctrine immediately apparent.
I maintain that the significance of self-reflexivity being required for cognition, and the claim that selfreflexivity requires incorporeality, overcomes the apparent tentativeness of Aristotle's initial remarks in De Anima (403a3-12) that if there is a part of the soul that is separable, then it is likely the intellect.
Rather, Aristotle's understanding of cognition arguably commits him to the position that for cognition to be possible, the intellect must be incorporeal and separable. This is because, as 
Immortality of the Soul in Aristotle 22
If soul is both incorporeal and separable in Aristotle, as the above arguments have attempted to show it to be, then what remains for the issue of harmonization is to show that Aristotle is committed not only to separability, but also to the kind of immortality that Plato argues for. In this section then, I will aim to show that the argument for harmonism here is sound, first by illustrating that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement that only part of the soul is immortal, and then by proceeding to show how Plato and Aristotle's conceptions of human personhood allow fertile ground for a coherent harmonization of their conceptions of the human soul's immortality.
Immortality of only part of the soul in Plato and Aristotle
We have already seen in the above that in De Anima, Gamma 5, Aristotle holds that only the so-called ‗active intellect' is immortal and eternal. Plato's most salient remarks on the soul, those that the Neoplatonic commentators took to be authoritative, and amenable to Platonic-Aristotelian harmony (and therefore most relevant to this article), can be found in the Phaedo and Timaeus 23 . The Platonic definition of soul, though at times somewhat nebulous, can be usefully summarized for the purposes of this article as: that immortal part of a human being which exists before birth and after death, animates the body (and as such, uses the body as a kind of vehicle), and consists of both an immortal (rational) and mortal (appetitive and vegetative
24
) part, the former of which is superior to the latter, and both of which are superior to (and rule over) the corporeal body
25
. 19 Ibid, 48-52. 20 This intellect is distinguished from the divine intellect of the Demiurge by virtue of its not being, like the Demiurge, essentially identical with its objects, but only partially identical. See Coombs 2016: 95-96. 21 I am not here making any claims along developmentalist lines concerning the development of Aristotelian psychological doctrine ‗towards' the position described. The claim is simply that, when taken as a whole and with a harmonic picture of Aristotelian-Platonic metaphysics also in mind, Aristotelian psychological doctrine can be usefully described as a kind of synthetic hylomorphism which emerges from the causal primacy of the intelligible to the sensible, applied to the relationship between the human body and soul. In this way Pseudo-Simplicius illustrates in what way the soul is both separable and inseparable from the body; -the soul uses the body -completely‖ when we digest food and breathe; it uses the body transcendentally when we consciously desire something and move to obtain it‖ (Gerson 2005: 138) . In other words, as the actuality of the function of the body as organism, that part of the soul is inseparable, but as the actuality of the functions of cognition, that part of the soul is entirely separatea position that does not contradict the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato's doctrine, and can therefore be said to be in line with harmony. Yet, even with this harmony in terms of separability and immortality of part of the soul established, it remains to be shown whether Aristotle endorses a similar kind of immortality to Plato, and of course, we must take into account Aristotle's apparent rejection of the doctrine of reincarnation.
Intellectual versus personal immortality and the problem of reincarnation
As shown above, both Plato and Aristotle seem to hold to the immortality of only part of the soul, and this provides solid ground for asserting the possibility of harmony between the Platonic and -There exists nothing divine or blessed among men except that which alone is worthy of attention, whatever there is of intellect or wisdom in us. For this alone seems to be immortal and the only divine things of ours. And in virtue of being able to share in this power, however wretched and hard life is by nature, still things have been favourably arranged so that in comparison with other things man would seem to be a god. -Our intellect is god,‖ says either Hermotimus or Anaxagoras, and that -the mortal always has a portion of god‖. We ought to philosophize, therefore, or say farewell to life and depart from it since everything else seems to be much foolishness and folly.‖ Gerson (2005: 57) notes that this passage indicates that -…Aristotle no more than Plato thinks that the immortality of intellect alone diminishes our immortality‖ and that the -exhortation to philosophize is [in both Plato and Aristotle]… an exhortation to identify oneself in some sense with intellect‖. Gerson (2005: 57) adds that this identification -amounts to an appropriation or construction of selfhood‖, but that -in the Aristotelian (and Platonic) context, it is an appropriation of what one really or ideally is‖.
In this sense, it seems more appropriate to call this appropriation of selfhood an ‗unveiling' of Selfhood, in the very Platonic and rather mystical sense -a sense that it must be admitted, given the clear harmony even to the point of phraseology that we see here with Aristotle, is shared closely by Plato's protégé. I agree wholeheartedly with Gerson (2005: 57) that the -claim by Jaeger and others that the immortality of intellect alone would make a mockery of personal aspirations indicates nothing more than Jaeger's own conception of the personal‖. I don't believe the first objection can be taken as a serious impediment to harmony, which is not to be understood as the identity of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle (Gerson 2005: 8 Unfortunately, an investigation of this latter issue would take us too far beyond the scope of this article.
Conclusion
Identifying separability and immortality as key features of Aristotle's psychological doctrine is no doubt a position that is far removed from the contemporary hegemony of Aristotelian exegesis.
Nevertheless, when properly investigated, the dualism espoused by Aristotle not only makes the entire unfamiliar, but is far more philosophically and exegetically tenable than its hylomorphic and functionalist counterparts.
Taking Aristotle's psychological doctrine as an expression of hylomorphism simpliciter has several significant drawbacks -most importantly, it cannot account for Aristotle's argument for the immortal soul outside of the seriously problematic confines of an ad-hoc developmentalism. A functionalist interpretation, on the other hand, cannot account for the necessity of intellect being properly incorporeal for cognition as Aristotle understands it to be possible. A dualist account solves these problems. Moreover, given that this dualism is not strictly reducible to Platonic dualism (but might rather be described as a kind of -emergent hylomorphism‖), the position highlights both the harmony and difference between the Aristotelian and Platonic psychological doctrines, resulting in a clearer understanding of both -which was exactly the goal the Neoplatonic commentators had in mind, after all.
That this dualism involves a separable, incorporeal, and, by Aristotle's own account, immortal soul, makes the possible harmony of these two thinkers on this issue clear. Not only that, but it draws attention to a deep similarity between the conceptions of both embodied and disembodied personhood in Plato and Aristotle. When the characterization of the good life as the life of contemplation (a characterization that is shared between The Philosopher and his teacher) is taken into account, objections pointing to some fundamental difference in their conceptions of metaphysical and moral personhood evaporate. Though some questions surrounding the harmony described here remain without definitive answer (such as the issue of reincarnation), there is at least enough evidence to warrant serious re-evaluation of long-standing assumptions about Aristotle's categorical opposition to the psychological doctrines of Plato. It would seem that if indeed Aristotle could be described as a hylomorphist, then it must also be admitted that he was in truth a kind of Platonic hylomorphist.
Investigating the merits of this position would, I believe, offer much insight into the thought of these two giants of Western philosophy, and do proper justice to the nuanced arguments for their harmony put forward by the Neoplatonic commentators 36 .
